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WALT WHITMAN.
MY LITTLE WREATH OF THOUGHTS AND MEMORIES.
BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.
The phenomenal poet had a phenomenal funeral.
I went to the poor frame house in Camden with an old
college chum who happens to be an eminent railway
president in Philadelphia : we took our place at the
end of a long row of people in the street, working men
and women, children, who to the number of four thou-
sand filed through the house to look upon the dead
poet. There he lay in the familiar gray garb, his face
in such sweet and beautiful repose that I shall always
be more friendly with death for having seen it. None
could look upon this face without reverence. Rem-
brandt would have selected it from a million. The
magnificent dome of head and forehead, and the glory
of snowy white hair ; the brow, unfurrowed ; the del-
icate mouth, not concealed by the thin moustache,
the long flowing beard ; the finely cut features, the ex-
pression of perfect peace and perfect kindliness : they
were all a marvellous refrain to his own poem on
"lonely and soothing Death," with which the funeral
celebration in the woods presently opened. It is the
face of an aged loving child. As I looked it was with
the reflection that during an acquaintance of thirty-six
years I never heard from those lips a word of irrita-
tion, or depreciation of any being. I do not believe
that Buddha, of whom he appeared an avatar, was
more gentle to all men, women, children, and living
things. There arose in my memory many thoughts
that I have heard from him, in the spirit that wrote
the closing lines of his " Leaves of Grass " :
Dear friend, whoever you are, take this kiss.
1 give it especially to you—Do not forget nie
;
I feel like one who has done work for the day, I
ve now aga
vhile other:
1 of r
ubtle
1 1 dr^
etire awhile ;
I my avataras asce
.An unknown sphere, more r
ing rays about me
—
So lon^ f
Remember my words—I may again return,
1 love you—I depart from materials ;
1 am as one disembodied, triumphant, dead."
There were touching responses. From all parts of
the world wreaths were sent ; myrtle from the grave of
Key, author of the "Star Spangled Banner"; flowers
from the poets Gilder and Stedipan ; and some lilies
from old Mrs. Davis who nursed him to the last. Por-
traits of his mother and father looked from the walls.
Near by was the large bust of his spiritual father,
Elias Hicks, founder of the Hicksite Quakers. Large
histories found some connection with this little room
where Walt Whitman lay. I remember hearing Car-
lyle talk of the "Leaves of Grass," which Emerson
had sent him. He recognised something of the mys-
terious fire called genius, but was repelled by the dem-
ocratic enthusiasm. "He seems to be saying, 'I am
a big man because I live in such a big country.' I
know of great men who have come from small and ob-
scure corners of the world." Carlyle should have seen
the poor little house, in poor little Mickle Street,
which contented the man he supposed inflated. Whit-
man combined a childlike humility with a childlike
delight in all applause of his works. His pleasure in
such tributes was mainly that he might transfer them
to America. The inspiration of the New World was
to him much the same as to a Quaker the moving
Spirit, to which he ascribes whatever he utters. Walt
Whitman's ambition would have been more than sat-
isfied by recognition as a rude pioneer of a race of
American bards who should exalt and transfigure the
facts and features of their own country. This country
he could never criticise; his feeling towards America
was personal ; to criticise it would be to him like
dwelling on the faults of his mother. The nearest
thing to fault-finding I ever heard from him was when,
in deprecating something said of the tendency of de-
mocracy to commonplace, he said he thought it too
soon to say that; that democracy was in its infancy;
and an improvement would appear when women were
enfranchised.
It was a beautiful soft day when we bore Walt
Whitman to his vault,—that great rough-hewn granite
vault in the side of a wooded hill several miles out of
Camden. There Col. Ingersoll spoke more impres-
sively than I had before heard him speak ; Dr. Binton,
Dr. Bucke,—one for Philadelphia, one for England,
—
spoke well ; and Thomas Harned, Whitman's neigh-
bor, feelingly conveyed his old friend's farewell to his
humble neighbors, and thanks for their kindnesses, as
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he had been enjoined by the dying man. There were,
however, comparatively few authors present,— I saw
about seven. There have been several severe criti-
cisms in the press showing animosity towards Whit-
man. There has been some resentment, in certain
literary quarters, that the authors of England, with
Lord Tennyson at their head, should have singled out
this particular man for their homage. But these
critics would be wiser if they studied the fact instead
of resenting it. The English love Walt Whitman be-
cause he is totally un-English. This was what Emer-
son felt when, after reading the " Leaves of Grass,"
he wrote the poet: "It meets the demand I am always
making of what seemed the sterile and stingy nature,
as if too much handiwork, or too much lymph in the
temperament, were making our western wits fat and
mean,." "I find it the most extraordinary piece of
wit and wisdom that America has yet contributed."
That was the secret : it was contributed by America.
Well do I remember a day when, in the early sum-
mer of 1855, as I entered Emerson's study he handed
me the " Leaves of Grass," of which I had not heard,
and which was just out. Emerson said : "Americans
abroad may now come home : unto us a man is born."
A month later I sought Walt Whitman out, in the
farthest part of Brooklyn. His father (English) had
died early in the year ; his mother (Dutch) I saw. She
was a kindly old lady, and I thought she seemed a
little frightened about her son's work. Whitman told
me, as we roamed about that Sunday, that I was the
first visitor whom his book had drawn. He had set
it up in type himself, and gave me a copy which I now
have. All of this he remembered four or five weeks
ago when I visited him. His memory was bright for
old times. He told me of persons he had known in
Huntington, Long Island, where he was born (1819).
Elias Hicks, who died in 1830, he heard preach. His
tall slender figure and earnest manner made a strong
impression on my childhood. Hicks resided in the
neighborhood of William Cobbett, and the two, he
thought, knew each other. He (Whitman) enjoyed the
personal friendship of Col. John Fellows of New York.
Fellows wrote several books (on Freemasonry, etc.)
which are now forgotten, but his constant friendship
for Thomas Paine is remembered. "Col. Fellows was
a ruddy well-dressed gentleman, often seen about the
courts. He told me that the pious legend of Paine's
being a drunkard, and so forth, is quite false : Paine
drank only as everybody else did. He said also that
Paine had a very large following in New York, which
increased after his death." While Whitman was
talking I several times arose to leave, fearing he might
suffer. But he never groaned or murmured ; he bade
me farewell very cordially. Although nothing of the
kind was said, we both felt that we were parting for-
ever,—that is, in this life ; for Whitman never had a
doubt of meeting all of his friends in some conscious
Nirvana.
That any one could find a trace of prurience in his
pages was a thing Whitman could not conceive. Those
who have censured him on this score cannot, on their
side, conceive the completeness with which the popu-
lar transcendentalism of the Hicksite movement revo-
lutionised the minds trained in its atmosphere. It was
a sort of mystical naturalism to which nothing in na-
ture—literally nothing—was common or unclean ; and
it was accompanied by an hereditary tendency to write
with what Emerson used to call "biblical plainness."
One of the most remarkable things about Walt Whit-
man was his spontaneous orientalism. Let me quote
from my "Sacred Anthology" a few passages which
I know were not translated when Whitman wrote the
"Leaves of Grass." Here are sentences from the
" Arthava Veda " :
" I praise the world, which is continually renewed.
May clean waters flow for our body : I wash me thoroughly and am clean.
All the range of thee, O earth, which I look over by the help of the sun-
may the sight of my eye lose none of it till the latest years that are to
May the peaceful earth, whose fragrance is excellent, whose breasts contain
the heavenly drinlC bless me with her milk ! "
Even more has Whitman the trick and accent of
the Persian poets of the tenth century—who were
partly Moslem and-partly Zoroastrian. The following
is from Faizi :
1 and
" The companion of my loneliness is my genius.
Did I bring forth what is in my mind, could llie age bear it ?
In my regulated reason I see the system of the universe, and in
earth my motion and my rest.
My own blood is the basis of the wine of my enthusiasm.
Although I liave buried my head in my hood, I can see both worlds; it may
be that love has woven ray garment from the threads of my contem-
plation.
I have become dust, but from the odor of my grave people shall know that
man rises from such dust."
The Persian Urfi calls his own name in his poetry
in the same manner as Whitman :
closed do .vhich" Urfi has done well to stand quietly befo
would open : he did not knock at another door.
To pine for the arrival of young spring shows narrowness of mind ; him-
dreds of beauties are on the heap of rubbish in the backyard which
are not met with in the rose garden."
Walt Whitman was not a reader of oriental books
unless in later years ; but it will be seen that he had
reproduced some characteristics of those ancient lit-
eratures. The "Leaves of Grass" was certainly a
sort of New York Vedas. The Western mind finds
erotic element^ in the warm spiritual passion of the
oriental writers ; they are tolerated only in the Bible.
But Whitman has gone farther than the Bible lands,
and sees life and nature with the eyes of an old der-
vish. Strange, this correspondence between the colors
of the world's sunrise and sunset !
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NATURE AND MORALITY.
AN EXAMINATION OF THE ETHICAL VIEWS OF JOHN
"' STUART MILL.
[continued.]
II. THE ETHICS TAUGHT BV NATURE.
What can be the meaning of Mr. Mill's objection
to basing morality upon nature, i. e. upon the entire
system of things, of the universe, of which we are a
part? I see only three possibilities: either it means
(i) that there is no ethics at all, or (2) that ethics is
imported somehow into the world from the outside, or
(3) that ethics is a purely subjective invention, that it
is an artificial product of man's fancy.
If nature were a chaos, if there were no constancy of
law in the universe, no regularity but only the sportive
arbitrariness of an irregular play of chance, no world-
order but a tohnvabhohu of general confusion, intelli-
gent as well as moral action would be impossible, for
no calculation of consequences would be reliable. Yet if
there is a world-order, conformity to it will be possible.
Upon the presence of law depends the intelligibility
of the world ; the regularity of law is the basis of ra-
tional action, of foresight, of responsibility, and of
moral action.
The view that ethics are imported into the world
from the outside is the theological theory of revelation.
It is based upon the dualistic world- conception that
the world and God are two distinct entities. The
world by itself is supposed to be a chaos, but God
brings order into it by penetrating the chaos. Ac-
cording to this view the regularity of law is not of the
world but of God ; it is not an intrinsic feature of ex-
istence, but it is imposed upon it by an extra-mundane
Deity.
The view that ethics is a purely subjective inven-
tion, that it is human to the exclusion of the not hu-
man in nature, we may fairly assume, is Mr. Mill's
view. Mr. Mill would have objected to the idea of
considering his view as a special case of the revelation
theory in ethics, but such it is none the less. What
is the human but a product of nature. Those forces
and laws which shaped man are the very same agen-
cies which shaped the rest of the things in the universe.
If the human be something so radically different from
and in essence so extraordinarily superior to the whole
of nature as to justify the idea that the human can create
a new world-order instead of using the world order
that exists by accommodating itself to it, it must con-
tain, at least in germ, a certain something that is not
of this world. Man's existence in that case must be
the revelation of an extra-mundane power which thus
enables him to rise above nature so as to be her su-
perior.
Mr. Mill does not accept this view. There is no
doubt about it that he regards man as the product of
nature. His philosophical standpoint excludes the
possibility of revelation. Accordingly, he can only
mean that ethics is an artificial product of man's im-
agination. Man shapes his moral ideals as the musi-
cian composes a sonata or as the poet conceives a
beautiful dream.
There are men who believe that ethics cannot be
based upon facts, i. e. upon nature, but that it must be
based upon some principle. But what is the value of
a principle if it is not derived from facts? Ideals are
mere dreams unless they are realisable, and to be re-
alisable they must be shaped out of the facts of expe-
rience. Principles are rules to attain ideals. If ideals
are in conflict with nature and nature's laws, what is
their use? If they are not based upon a solid knowl-
edge of facts, they are nothing but worthless vagaries
of the human mind and it will be a positive waste of
time to ponder over them or to give them a minute's
serious thought.
There is only one kind of ideal that is useful and
worthy of man's attention. It is that ideal which aims
at creating a better state of things upon the ground of
the eternal order of things. Ideals must be based
upon the terra firma of natural law, otherwise they are
mere fancies.
This world of ours in which we live is a world of
law, and the irrefragibility of natural law renders in-
telligent action possible. Intelligent action is such as
foresees and predetermines the course of events. Intel-
ligent action consists in fixing an aim and in adapting
means to this aim as an end. Intelligent action is the
condition of moral action. Intelligent action becomes
moral through rationalising the aim of action. Man-
kind in the child phase of its development obeys al
most blindly its natural impulses, the general intent of
which has been characterised as self-preservation.
Self-preservation remains the ultimate aim of moral
action. Yet with a modification, with an amplification
and an increase of man's knowledge of the nature of
himself, the ultimate aim of his actions must be mod-
ified.
The question arises. Can man at all preserve his
self? Is not every individual doomed to die and is
not self-preservation for any length of time absolutely
impossible? Yes, it is impossible, if by "self" we un-
derstand this particular body consisting of a definite
quantity of living matter in a special form. This par-
ticular self cannot be preserved for it is constantly
changing ; through slight modifications it becomes
another with every minute, with every second of its life.
Yet man's self contains a something that is pre-
served, that is transmitted to others. What is this
part of his self? Every man has received it, or a^
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least the greatest part of it, through heredity and edu-
cation, from his ancestors. It is his organisation in-
cluding the rationality of his speech, thoughts, and ac-
tions—in one word it is his soul. His fellowman, too,
has inherited it and in so far as two or several men
recognise the sameness of their souls, they call each
other brothers. In preserving his fellowmen's souls
a man preserves his own soul.
An advanced knowledge of self necessarily changes
the original impulse of self-preservation into a preser-
vation of the soul.
Man, as a particular individual being mortal, can
preserve his soul only in and through others. The
nature of man's being is social and his life is ephem-
eral. Thus self-knowledge will teach him that he is
a part of a greater whole ; the most important elements
of his soul originate out of his intercourse with his
fellow-beings ; the essence of his life, of his speech,
his thoughts, his aspirations and ideals, lies in his con-
nections with them. At the same time he must learn
that his particular life is only a phase in the fuller life
of the soul which has come to him out of the past
animating him now and sweeping onward into the dim
future. Man's real self is not the materiality of which
his body consists at a given moment, but his soul.
The former cannot be preserved, the latter can. Any
attempt at preserving the former is thwarted by na-
ture. If we attempt to preserve anything of ourselves,
we can preserve only our soul. No other choice is left.
There is one strange fact about self-preservation.
This world of ours is never at rest, there is no stand-
still. Any attempt at preserving life exactly as it is
leads to dissolution. Preservation is only possible in
growth ; the preservation of life must be for its further
development, it must include progress.
Such is in broad outlines the injunction that nature
teaches. Such is an ethics based upon the facts of
life, it is the derivation of an ultimate aim of action
from nature, i. e. from the nature of the being that
acts and also from the nature of the world in which this
being lives. When we thus base our ethics upon the
facts of experience and the natural laws that have
been derived therefrom ; in one word, when we base
our ethics upon nature, we define those actions as
moral which tend to preserve and further develop the
human soul.
III. INTELLIGENT ACTION AND MORAL ACTION.
Mr. Mill says, " to make use of knowledge for guid-
ance is a rule of prudence." But it is more ; it is also
a rule of ethics.
What is the difference between a prudent action
and an ethical action ? A prudent action may have
been performed from a selfish motive merely ; an eth-
ical action is performed from a motive broader than
self-interest, from a desire to be somehow of service
to the development of humanity. Prudence is not
morality ; but prudence will lead to morality, for all
immorality will defeat itself in the end. Thus prudence
teaches us to avoid immorality.
Not every intelligent action is moral ; but every
moral action is intelligent ; and it is an indispensable
principle of morality to render all actions intelligent.
Yet while all moral actions are intelligent, the intelli-
gence or rationality of an action does not as yet make
it moral.
A man may act in the right way against his in-
clinations from mere prudence. He may act in a cer-
tain way not because he wants to do the act, but be-
cause he knows that it is after all the best way ; he
thus acts against his will ; he acts under a certain com-
pulsion. His act in such a case may be called mere
prudence. However as soon as the desire to act in the
best way or to act as he knows that he should act, be-
comes part of his character, as soon as he performs the
act done in the right way, because he wills it, his ac-
tion is truly ethical.
All our actions— even those performed for our pri-
vate interest, which are perfectly legitimate—should
be guided by higher motives than by the impulse of
a selfish self preservation ; all our proceedings, our
omissions and our undertakings should be regulated by
superindividual considerations ; they should be in strict
harmony with what may fitly be called the moral law.
The moral law has been taught us by our parents
and teachers. We may accept their instruction simply
on the ground of their authority, but we have a perfect
right to ask. Why must we obey moral commands ?
And the answer would be : Because the natural course
of events demands it. Nature defeats all egoistic in-
tentions ; and it sanctions the superindividual aspira-
tions only—those which are commonly called moral
principles.
There is no right in this world but it is the coun-
terpart of duty. We have a right to ask why egotism
should be overruled by higher principles. What is the
duty that corresponds to this right ? This duty is our
obligation to inquire into the conditions of human life,
so as to ascertain the principles by which our actions
must be regulated. We must not rest satisfied with
our moral sentiments ; we must understand our senti-
ments, that we may be assured not by mystic intuition
but by clear comprehension, that they are truly moral.
We must be on our guard against ethical enthusiasm
which is not based upon a clear comprehension of facts
;
for there are many noble sentiments which, as can be
demonstrated by scientific investigation, are anything
but morality. For instance, eleemosynary philan-
thropy, has been highly praised as the acme of moral-
ity ; and yet, scientific investigation has stated with
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irrefutable conclusiveness that it is a wrong practice.
All enthusiasm that has been wasted in this direction,
can be called moral only if motives alone be considered.
Objectively, they are as immoral as any criminal act
committed under the influence of an erring conscience.
[to be concluded.]
ELECTING SENATORS BY THE PEOPLE
BY M. M. TRUMBULL.
A SHORT and easy lesson in American democracy is the speech
made by Senator Palmer in the United States Senate on the propo-
sition to elect senators by the direct vote o£ the people. Some of
it is new, and some of it is not, but the speech is interesting and
instructive both as history and as argument, for Senator Palmer is
quite familiar with the evolution of the American constitution and
the constitution of Illinois. The builder of a State, speaking to a
new generation is worth hearing, and Senator Palmer was a mem-
ber of the convection that made a constitution for Illinois forty-
five years ago; a constitution which weakened the aristocratic apex
and strengthened the democratic base of the political state. Of
this he is rightfully proud.
Senator Palmer, as a philosophic democrat, is jealous of a Na-
tional aristocracy elected by State legislatures. He would have
the Senate elected by a direct vote of the people, and he gives
good reasons why, but this argument will carry thousands of his
countrymen, if it does not carry him, far beyond the mild propo-
sition to reform the Senate by a more democratic mode of electing
senators. This will do for a beginning, but Senator Palmer can.
not logically stop there. Having challenged one prerogative of
the American peerage he must go on, and amend his amendment
so as to reduce the senatorial term of office, and give States a rep-
resentation in the Senate in proportion to their population. Sena-
tor Palmer says he desires to make the Senate " what it never has
been ; the popular branch of the American Congress." Truly a
democratic purpose, but bow can he accomplish it so long as a
member of the Senate is elected for six years, and a member of
the House of Representatives for only two years ; and so long as
Delaware has a representation in the Senate equal to that of Illi-
nois ?
When great abuses grew and flourished under the constitu-
tion, men interested in the wrongs done, made an idol of it, and
declared that whatever it permitted became thereby sanctified. In
the ecumenical councils where party creeds were canonised, it was
made the Holy Scripture of politics, and its Immaculate concep-
tion became the superstition of a people. Senator Palmer is free
from this idolatry, for he forcibly says, "It is not a sufficient an-
swer to the popular dissatisfaction with the present mode of elect-
ing senators to say that it is the method provided by the constitu-
tion." Certainly not ; and that bit of common sense will apply to
every part of the constitution. It is nothing but a code, adopted
for the service of the people, and like every other law it may be
amended. This attack upon the mode of electing senators is
merely a continuation of the old struggle between the Lords and
the Commons which in some shape or other has been agitating the
English race for more than six hundred years.
Speaking of the feeling that animated the delegates who framed
the constitution. Senator Palmer says, " It is manifest that there
prevailed in the convention the most profound distrust of popular
elections." Yes, and the distrust was reflected in the constitution
itself, for that instrument curtailed the political power of the peo-
ple, and made them subject to a government which was jealously
guarded in all its branches except one from their direct political
interference. In the Judicial department of the National govern-
ment the American people have no voice whatever ; all the judges
being appointed by the President. In the Executive department
they have a roundabout and qualified vote for President and Vice
President ; but for cabinet ministers and the other executive offi-
cers below the President they have no vote at all. As to the Legis-
lative branch, the people have original jurisdiction by direct ballot
over the House of Representatives only, the Senate being the profit-
able perquisite of the State legislatures.
Notwithstanding its contemptuous distrust of the people, they
have become so mystified and overawed by the Divine claims made
for the Constitution that they really believe the limited rights they
do enjoy come to them by the grace and condescension of that in-
strument. They do not think for a moment that the Constitution
is inferior and subject to them, but religiously believe that they
are inferior and subject to the Constitution.
Senator Palmer says, " The fraraers of the Constitution found
but little difficulty in the application of the principle, then, as
now, so important, of distributing the powers of the government
to three independent departments." The reason why they found
no difficulty in that matter was that having lived under the Eng-
lish monarchy, and being familiar with its forms, they adopted as
nearly as possible what they understood, the English trinity of
government. King, Lords, and Commons, merely changing the
names, and making the King, and the House of Lords elective ;
not by the people, however, but by a carefully sifted few.
It is not easy to convince Americans that the Senate is their
House of Lords, and that it was intended to be so. Senator
Palmer has no doubt about it, for he quotes evidence to prove it,
and says, " But it is probable that the general purpose of the con-
vention in the organisation of the Senate and in the mode of elect-
ing Senators was expressed by Mr. Dickinson, who said he wished
' the Senate to consist of the most distinguished characters ; dis-
tinguished for their rank in life and their weight of property, and
bearing as strong a likeness to the English House of Lords as pos-
sible,' and he thought 'such characters more likely to be selected
by the State Legislature than by any other mode.' " All that is
very interesting, and Senator Palmer might have added that Mr.
Gouverneur Morris, a delegate from New York thought that the
Senators ought to be elected for life.
To prove that the Constitution is not sacred and above amend-
ment. Senator Palmer shows that it has actually been amended
fifteen times, and that the very first Congress that assembled after
the adoption of the Constitution began the work of amending it by
proposing to make the Bill of Rights a part of it ; and on that
branch of the subject he says, " It may well excite surprise that
the framers of the Constitution who were familiar with the long
struggle in England to secure popular rights neglected to provide
in the Constitution securities for freedom in the exercise of re-
ligion, free speech, a free press, the right of the people peaceably
to assemble," and so on to the end of the charter. There was
nothing so very surprising in the omission, because the Conven-
tion thought that as each individual State would include the Bill
of Rights in its own Constitution, it would be superfluous to put
it in the National, or as it was then, the "Federal " Constitution,
but as Jefferson and the radical democrats complained of its omis
sion, the Bill of Rights was put there by amendment.
Jefferson was in Paris when the Convention was in session at
Philadelphia, but he watched very anxiously from a distance the
buildmg of the Constitution. As soon as it was finished he dis-
approved of its conservative character ; and in a letter to James
Madison written on the 20th of December, 1787, after telling what
he approved in it he said, "I will tell you what I do not like.
First, the omission of a bill of rights providing clearly and without
the aid of sophism for freedom of religion, freedom of the press,
protection against standing armies, restriction of monopolies, the
eternal and unremitting force of the habeas corpus laws, and
trials by jury in all matters of fact triable by the laws of the land."
Jefferson thought also that the Judicial department was too fa
3204 THE OPEN COURT.
away from popular control, and that the Constitution in some
other features bore too close a resemblance to that of the ancient
monarchy.
It is historically interesting to learn from Senator Palmer that
there was no opposition to a National Legislature consisting of
two branches, and that it was agreed to without debate or dissent,
except that of Pennsylvania, given probably from complaisance to
Dr. Franklin, who was said to be partial to a single house of leg-
islation." This does but feeble justice to Dr. Franklin, whose
opposition was not so much to two houses as it was to a House of
Lords ; for he saw as plainly in 1787, as Mr. Palmer does in
1892, that the Senate was to be in all its essential attributes and
character another House of Lords. He was the most far-sighted
statesman in the Convention, and he would not accept a House of
Lords at all until it was provided that it should have no power to
tax the people, and that the right of raising revenue by taxation
should be the sole prerogative of the House of Representatives.
The greatness of Dr. Franklin as a statesman has never been
acknowledged, but we are indebted to him for that provision of
the Constitution which declares that " All bills for raising revenue
shall originate in the House of Representatives." The courageous
assertion and maintenance of that right by the Commons of Eng-
land has reduced the King and the House of Lords to the position
of subordinate auxiliaries in the legislation of that country ; and it
will be so here, as Dr. Franklin was wise enough to see.
INGERSOLL-BUCKLEY-i8g2.
BY VIROE.
O, right but rash
Knight of the Word
In Truth's great host.
Be steadfast and beware :
However you may dare.
When two blades clash
'Tis the sharp sword
That suffers most.
CORRESPONDENCE.
THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.
To lite Editor of The Open Court :
In T!ie MonisI for April I noticed an article by Mr. Chas. S.
Peirce, entitled "The Doctrine of Necessity Examined." In it
he makes the following statement : "When I have asked thinking
"men what reason they had to believe that every fact in the uni-
" verse is precisely determined by law, the first answer has usually
"been that the proposition is a presupposition or a postulate of
"scientific reasoning." I would have answered him differently,
by saying, that the reason why I know (not believe) " that every
fact in the universe is precisely determined by law," is because it
is impossible to name any fact that is not determined by law, or
that any occurrence was not determined by something else that
occurred. This doctrine of necessity is a stone which has been
rejected by nearly all philosophical builders, but it will " yet be-
come the head of the scientific corner." While it may be philo-
.sophical as a means to an end—that end to spur mankind onward
— to say that God is sovereign and man is free, or that determin-
ism is wholly true and man is free, yet scientifically—truthfully
—
one or the other is false ; no sound reasoning can make both state-
ments true, for it is as much as to say that a horse hauls a load,
yet the load is free—it moves of itself.
But, as you stated in T/ie Open Court, No. 238, monism is a
starting point for a new departure, and if we are to take a new de-
parture we must not take it from a cape bearing the antithetical
name of yes and no. If we do, we will still be at sea without any
compass, star, or guide. Evolution is monistic in character, and
by its principle, and from its lofty and invulnerable cape, we must
take our departure ; for its latitude and longitude are now well
known ; no sophistical reasoning can change them ; evolution can-
not exceed involution ; hence Mr. Peirce's argument does not re-
main unrefuted. The doctrine of necessity is not based on chance,
as he seems to suppose, but upon well ordered law and intelli-
gence. If evolution is to begin, there must be power to begin it
;
and if it is to go on every change in its onworking must be " pre-
cisely determined by law " ; the thing evolving cannot get beyond
the power of the evolver ; it is always subject to involution and
the power of evolution, whether plant, rock, animal, or man. I
respectfully beg to differ from that school of evolutionists which
teaches that evolution comes by acquirement, because, on the con-
trary, acquirement comes by evolution— there cannot be evolution
without involution, and involution is as " precisely determined by
law " as evolution in accretions for either brain or brawn. I re-
spectfully request any reader of T/te Open Court to name any fact
that is not "precisely determined by law." I have not found one
yet. John Maddock.
[Mr. Maddock alludes in his remarks to the controversy he
had in our columns, but he is not free from misrepresenting his
antagonist when speaking of the car load as being free.
We do not at all agree with Mr. Peirce, but we think that it
is the most formidable attack upon the doctrine of necessity that
was ever made and believe that Mr. Peirce's article will be a pro-
fitable reading to those who do not agree with him. An editorial
article in reply to Mr. Peirce will appear in the next number of
The A/onis/.—'ED.}
BOOK REVIEWS.
What is Reality ? An Inquiry as to the Reasonableness of Nat-
ural Religion, and the Naturalness of Revealed Religion.
By Francis Howe Jolmson. Boston and New York : Hough-
ton, MifBin, & Company. 1891.
The object of this work is to develop the idea that reality is
the agreement of our thought with that which is external to our
thought, and by inference to establish the existence in the universe
of a self-conscious ego as the source of creation. Before consider-
ing the arguments adduced in support of this inference let us see
whether the definition given of reality is justifiable, and if so to
what it leads. The author refers in the first place to the fact that
any apparently external object may be an illusion, the proof of
which is the absence of certain qualities which we supposed to be
present. A thing is real only " when it is capable of fulfilling the
promises it makes to us." Hence, although we have no direct
knowledge of the whole nature of things, we may say that what we
call things are groups of events, that is of sensations, since every
sensation is an event. But the sensation of external objects is the
effect they produce upon us and thus we know them in their
qualities. It is of course assumed on the one hand that an external
world exists, and on the other hand that the subjective world is
equally real. There may be illusions of the internal world, just
as of the external world, but both alike have their rise in realities.
The starting point of subjective reality is our personal identity,
the ego, which is "an ultimate datum of consciousness." This da-
tum is the outcome of experience, and our belief in the continuity
of the ego is referrible to memory, which, by the registration of
the reactions of the ego, is the abiding certificate of its continuity
and identity. So far our author's reasoning is correct, and it must
be affirmed that, notwithstanding the ever changing conditions
of consciousness, there is an element or substratum. on which all
subjective reality depends.
What has gone before forms the ground-work for the follow-
ing propositions ; (i) I exist. (2) There exists in time and space a
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world external to myself. (3) I can produce changes in myself
and in that external world. (4) Changes take place in me and in
that world of which I am not the author. These propositions
taken literally cannot be objected to, but it will be asked at the
outset what is the personality that exists and acts ? The answer
to this question requires a definition of the f^o, to illustrate the
nature of which the author refers to the development of organic
forms from the simple cell and the unity in multiplicity which
marks every step. This unity is represented in the human being
by the intelligent, self conscious, self-asserting t;!,'!), but we are told
that there is no room for it in the organism, which is a multiplicity
of cells. Hence, the mystery of the unity of being is not solved,
although to the author it is the soul. It is surprising that so much
mystery is made of the unity of being, seeing that it naturally fol-
lows from the fact that "every animal, man included, is at the
outset a single nucleated cell." This cell at first constitutes the
whole organism, and therefore has a unity as perfect as that of the
grown man, whose organism is only that of the primitive cell,
which throughout all its multiplications and transformation retains
its pristine unity. The unity of being is thus the organism itself,
which is the seat of life and sensibility, although self-consciousness
is relegated to the higher nerve-centres. Here we have the real
basis of subjective reality, and the ultimate datum of conscious-
ness, that in which our personal identity consists, is the organism
itself.
We may now consider the reasoning by which the author
seeks to establish the existence in the universe of a self-conscious
c-go as the source of creation. While admitting that we cannot
know anything as it is in itself, which means only that we cannot
attain to a perfect knowledge of things "in the unity of all their
relations," the author maintains that it is not necessary to grasp
n// the relations of a thing in order to know its essential being.
Moreover, knowledge is not confined to relations, since the knowl-
edge of self which accompanies the awareness of a relation existing
between myself and something else is over and above a knowledge
of the relation. The self-conscious soul is in fact a thing-in-itself,
known directly as a peculiar and vital element of all experiences.
This thing-in-itself is known to us as the unity of being, as intelli-
gence, and as cause, and by analogy we may assume the existence
in the universe of a self-conscious being who stands in the same
relation to the world as the ego does to the physical organism.
We have already referred to the importance attached by the
author to the ' ' unity in multiplicity " which exists in the organism,
where the fgo dominates a hierachy of beings. The ege as iiiinni-
iwnt is not conscious of the separate individuality of the cells which
are its subjects. It knows them directly only in organised groups,
but as transcendent it knows them and ministers to them in the
same way as Jehovah is represented as having dealt in primitive
times with Israel. These ideas are by analogy applied to God, the
thought of whom as immanent has, "all through the Christian
ages .... lived alongside the thought of a God who is transcend-
ent," as in the symbolism of the human person immanency and
transcendency are united in a living and abiding reality. The fact
that man knows himself as intelligently causative justifies us in
postulating intelligent cause in the orderly adaptations of nature,
but it is not necessary to refer all creation directly to the supreme
mind. The adaptations of which nature is full may be regarded
as the cumulative product of innumerable inferior minds, without
excluding the divine agency from any point, and without limiting
the knowledge of God. "whose consciousness is coextensive with
the universe of which He is the centre."
This very ingenious analogy is well worked out and is sup-
ported by reference to various facts bearing on the theory of evo-
lution. But there are many difficulties in the way of its being ac-
cepted. Thus it is admitted that the microcosm does not accredit
the idea of origination out of nothing, and as that which has al-
ways existed is supposed to be modified by inferior intelligences,
what room is there for a supreme intelligence ? Moreover, as the
universe is governed by certain principles of activity which are
evidently inseparable from it, may we not regard nature as the
result of the orderly operation of those principles without calling
in the aid of intelligence at all ? The chief difficulty those who
regard nature as the outcome of intelligence have to contend with,
is to show that the universe as a whole is conscious. This is in
fact the central point of the author's argument, and, notwithstand-
ing the acuteness of his criticism of the philosophy of the uncon-
scious, he does not succeed in establishing it. Nor is it supported
by the analogy between the universe and the human ego. This, as
we have seen, is in reality the organism itself, the elements of
which are essential not only to its unity but to its very existence,
and which is sensitive throughout, and not merely at the chief
nerve centre. In the lowest organisms there is no trace even of
any nerve structure, which is the result of a process of evolution.
All that analogy justifies us in assuming therefore is that the uni-
verse as a whole is organic, and that it possesses a degree of sensi-
tiveness which resembles as little the sensitiveness of the amceba
as the latter resembles the feeling of the human organism
; while
its elements stand towards the universe in the same relation as do
the elements of the body towards the complete organism.
We have dwelt so long on the fundamental thesis of the work
before us, that we can say little with reference to " the naturalness
of revelation." The author takes the view, which has now in the
light of evolution become orthodox, that although revelation is
superhuman it is in accord with the order of nature. By revelation
the author means "the direct assistance and enlightenment of a
human mind by a mind infinitely greater than its own,—a mind
with which it is organically connected." Without such revelation
there could be no formation of new germinal ideas Such a view,
however, is equivalent to asserting that revelation is only a phase
of evolution. This is going further than the author would allow,
but it is the truth. What is called revelation is a reflection from
the human mind itself, and it is the necessary accompaniment of
man's progress towards natural enlightenment, which includes the
evolution of conscience as well as the development of the idea of
God.
Able as this work is in many respects we are compelled for the
reasons stated to reject its main conclusions. We agree, however,
with the author that "the premises of religion are as real as any
part of man's knowledge," although we must take exception to the
explanation he gives of those premises. S2.
The Only Good Thing in all the Worlds. By Prof. /. B
.
Turner. Chicago : The Open Court Publishing Co 1891.
The present book is not cast in the form of thought in which
we should have put it. The author has not availed himself of the
modern Bible-criticism presented us by the theological scholars of
Europe, as we should expect of a man who criticises the religious
dogmas of Christianity and comes to the conclusion that they
little agree with Christ's preachings. But the more interesting is
the book in other respects. It is the product of an American pio-
neer scholar, for he was one of the very first professors of the
growing west who came and settled here when the red man had
not yet retreated from the old home of the Illinois and most of the
country was still virgin soil. He is a representative western
thinker, showing all the strength and earnestness of our first set-
tlers. Those who are interested in knowing the latest verdict of
European scholars upon religious subjects will be disappointed in
reading his book, but those who wish to know what impressions
the doctrines of the Christian churches made upon an original but
to a certain degree lonely thinker, upon a deeply religious and
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truth loving man, will be richly repaid by a perusal of Professor
Turner's book.
Professor Turner is a faithful christian ; believing in Christ
he yet opposes with great vigor, often with vehement impatience
many most cherished dogmas of orthodox Christianity ; and his
arguments are often well put. We quote his view of inspiration
from p. 70-71
:
"Bayard Taylor, on his return from Arabia, some years ago,
"told me he found in those Idumean mountains, near where the
"author of the book of Job is supposed to have lived, a tribe of
"Arabian people who still retained all the old primitive modes
"and habits of life, of speech, thought and action which they in-
"herited from their old Abrahamic fathers, particularly with re.
"gard to their modes of speech. They still thoroughly believed
" in the Old Testament doctrine of inspiration, as defined by Job,
"and as is expressed in some of our older creeds; viz. that God
"Himself directly, spiritually inspired them to know, think, be-
"lieve and do all the good and true things that they ever do be-
"lieve, know, think or do, and they did not express this in any
"abstract proposition, but in their hourly life and conduct, and
"habits of speech, as did their fathers before them. Instead of
"saying, 'I believe, I think, this that and the other,' they would
'
' say, ' God has told me this, that and the other ; God met me
"this morning, or yesterday, or in some day past, and said so-and-
"30 to me, or He appeared to me in such-and-such a place, and
" under such-and-such conditions, and told me or commanded me
" to do this or that.' And this personified and dramatised mode of
"speech meant no more to them, and seemed no more strange to
" them than ours does to us, when we say, ' I sincerely believe or
"think this, that or the other.' For they were in the habit of
" using it daily about all sorts of affairs and interests of any im-
" portance to them.
"There may be a question as to which of the two modes of
"speech, theirs or ours, is most profoundly philosophical and re-
"ligious, but there can be no question that either party is bound
"to accept the thoughts of the other, whether expressed abstractly
"or dramatically, without a further examination, nor do they
" hold it so. For each man still insists on revising what God has
" said to his neighbors, by what God has said to himself, as Christ
"rightly did in the case of Moses and of all the old Jews ; and it
"has now turned out to us as clear as daylight that He was al-
" ways philosophically in the right whenever they were philo-
"sophically in the wrong, and their methods of dramatising their
"speech makes not the slightest difference with its weight and im-
" portance, and any pretended monopoly of the inspiration of the
" world is worse than a pretended monopoly of its wealth."
So far so good. We take the same view of inspiration. But
Professor Turner applies the principle in a peculiar way. While
modern bible criticism has proved that Matthew and John are
rather late productions of the early Christian literature, certainly
later than Mark, Professor Turner makes them the cornerstone of
his "Christ word." He says p. 72-73 :
" The only books in the Bible or now in the world, ' according
"to scripture,' that even pretend to have any authority from
"Christ himself are the two simple narratives of Matthew and
"John, neither of which pretends to any other inspiration than
" the simple fact that they had seen and heard the Lord, the sole,
"true revealer of God, the Father of all, and of His kingdom of
"the heavens, and Himself the sole /curios, curator, caretaker,
"leader, and teacher of all His children here on earth, their
"elder brother, /he only true and full-born Son of Man; and,
" therefore, (/ true Son of God."
It is the ethics of Christianity which inspire Professor Turner
and he accepts the fourth gospel apparently because Christian
ethics have found in it their purest and grandest expression.
The book with all its rather ferocious denunciations of dog-
mas and creeds and with all its other shortcomings deserves our
attention as a typically American book characterising the aspira
tions of liberal religious thought in a period of the history of our
country that is fast disappearing now. p. c.
NOTES.
The publication is announced for the present month of a new
'
' newspaper " called Thought Ne-os The aim of Tliought X.nos is
to supply the want of a magazine ' ' which shall not go beyond fact,
which shall report thought rather than dress it up in the garments
of the past, which, instead of dwelling at length upon the merely
individual processes that accompany the facts, shall set forth the
facts themselves ; which shall note new contributions to thought,
whether by book or magazine, from the standpoint of the news in
them, and not from that of patron or censor. The immediate re-
sponsibility for the conduct of the magazine will lie in the bands
of Prof John Dewey, of Ann Arbor, Mich. Its cost will be $1.50
per volume (12 numbers); it will appear irregularly, as often as
the material warrants, but at least once a month. We wish the
project all success.
We are informed that Helen Gardener is about to publish a
new work, entitled "Pushed by Unseen Hands."
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Art of Reasoning, taught in progressive exercises. A special course in logic
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